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Abstract—In this paper, we show a security engineering process
based on a formal notion of refinement fully formalized in the
proof assistant Isabelle. This Refinement-Risk Cycle focuses on
attack analysis and security refinement supported by interactive
theorem proving. Since we use a fully formalized model of
infrastructures with actors and policies we can support a novel
way of formal security refinement for system specifications.
This formal process is built practically as an extension to the
Isabelle Infrastructure framework with attack trees. We define
a formal notion of refinement on infrastructure models. Thanks
to the formal foundation of Kripke structures and branching
time temporal logic in the Isabelle Infrastructure framework,
these stepwise transformations can be interleaved with attack
tree analysis thus providing a fully formal security engineering
framework. The process is illustrated on an IoT healthcare case
study introducing GDPR requirements and blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a notoriously difficult property for system
development because it is not compositional: given secure
components, a system created from those components is not
necessarily secure. Therefore, the usual divide-and-conquer
approach from system and software design does not apply
for security engineering. At the same time, it is mandatory
for the design of secure systems to introduce security in the
early phases of the development since it cannot be easily
“plugged in” at later stages. However, even if security is
introduced in early phases, a classical stepwise development
of refining abstract specifications by concretizing the design
does not preserve security properties. Take for example, the
implementation of sending a message from a client A to a
server B such that the communication is encrypted to protect
its content. In the abstract system specification we do not
consider a concrete protocol nor the architecture of the client
and server. Using common refinement methods from software
engineering provides a possible implementation by passing
the message from a client system AS connected by a secure
channel to a server system BS. However, this implementation
does not exclude that other processes running on either AS
or BS can eavesdrop on the cleartext message because the
confidentiality protection is only on the secure channel from
AS to BS. This example is a simple illustration of what
is known as the security refinement paradox [12]. Why is
security so hard? A simple explanation is that it talks about
negative properties: something (loss or damage of information
or functionality) must not happen. Negation is also in logic
a difficult problem as it needs exclusion of possibilities. If
the space to consider is large, this proof can be hard or
infeasible. In security, the attacks often come from “outside the
model”. That is, for a given specification we can prove some
security property and yet an attack occurs which uses a fact
or observation or loophole that just has not been considered
in the model. This known practical attack problem is similar
to the refinement paradox. Intuitively, the attacker exploits a
refinement of the system that has not been taken into account
in the specification but is actually part of the real system (an
implementation of the specification). In the above example,
the real system allows that other applications can be run on
the client within the security boundary. This additional feature
of multi-processing systems has not been taken into account
in the abstract specification in the above example where we
considered processes and systems – the client and the server –
as abstract entities without distinguishing the features of their
internal architectures.
Sadly, 100% security is not achievable, therefore, the next
best thing is to find ways to gradually improve the security of
a system. This should ideally be done at design time since a
specification can be changed while changing a system is ex-
pensive. A pragmatic way of engineering secure systems is to
pursue the identification of security goals as part of a security
requirements engineering process while complementing this
with the establishment of an attacker model. To this end, we
propose a formal process of system development that focuses
on attack analysis and security refinement in one integrated in-
teractive process interleaving system development with attack
analysis using attack trees [34]. To support this ambitious goal,
the current paper pulls together strands of previous works,
for the first time succeeding in combining attack analysis
and system refinement in one consistent automated framework
illustrating it on a complex case study. The paper presents a
generic theory of refinement in Isabelle that manifests linking
the notion of attack trees with state based system refinement
based on a Kripke semantics and temporal logic. The security
refinement is illustrated on an IoT healthcare example that is
entirely formalized in Isabelle on top of the underlying theory.
The contributions of this paper are: (a) we present a fully
formalized process of security refinement for infrastructure
systems using a notion of refinement and derive useful theory
for it. The resulting Refinement-Risk Cycle integrates formal
system development with risk analysis by attack trees; (b)
we illustrate the process by showing the development of an
IoT healthcare system from the CHIST-ERA project SUC-
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CESS [7] exhibiting security attacks and formally refining
the system specification step-by-step. An earlier workshop
paper [17], already introduced the Refinement-Risk Cycle but
only informally exhibiting the IoT healthcare example. The
current paper subsumes this workshop paper by defining a
formal process of refinement. It thus formalizes a process of
security engineering. Interestingly, although the system itself
had also been formalised in the informal precursor [17], the
earlier specification contains subtle design errors that make
a secure refinement impossible. These errors have now been
identified by applying the formal refinement that constitutes
the fundamental core of the Refinement-Risk cycle. Thus,
the current addition of the foundation of the Refinement-
Risk cycle is a contribution that not only largely extends
[17] but by scrutinizing the example establishes the validity
of the security refinement and proves its valor. As a further
additional contribution, we finally present the analysis of the
error correction.
In the remainder of this section we briefly summarize
the underlying Isabelle Infrastructure framework including
Kripke structures, CTL and Attack Trees that we used as
the foundation for the current work. A detailed account is
contained in the Appendix. Next, we present the Refinement-
Risk-Cycle (RR-Cycle) and in particular the formal notion
of refinement that allows security refinement (Section II).
We then illustrate this process on the application to the case
study first giving an overview and initial model (Section III)
before providing technical details of the cycle’s application
by the stepwise system refinement steps triggered by attacks
(Section IV). We finally present the design errors that could
be identified (Section IV-E) before we conclude in Section V.
All developments and the application to the case study are
formalised in Isabelle. The sources are available online [18].
A. Kripke structures, CTL, and Attack Trees
Figure 1 gives an overview of the Isabelle Infrastructure
framework with its layers of object-logics – each level below
embeds the one above showing the novel contribution of this
paper in colours on the top.
In the course of various extensions (detailed in the Ap-
pendix), the Isabelle framework has been restructured such
that it is now a general framework for the state-based security
analysis of infrastructures with policies and actors. Tempo-
ral logic and Kripke structures build the foundation. Meta-
theoretical results have been established to show equivalence
between attack trees and CTL statements [14]. This foundation
provides a generic notion of state transition on which attack
trees and temporal logic can be used to express properties.
The main notions used in this paper are:
• Kripke structures and state transitions:
Using a generic state transition relation 7→, Kripke struc-
tures are defined as a set of states reachable by 7→ from
an initial state set, for example
Kripke {t. ∃ i ∈ I. i →∗ t} I
• CTL statements:
For example, we can write
Kripke structures & CTL
Attack trees
Model transformations
RR Loop X
IoT healthcare
Fig. 1. Generic framework for infrastructures with refinement.
K ` EF s
to express that in Kripke structure K there is a path on
which the property s (a set of states) will eventually hold.
• Attack trees:
The datatype of attack trees has three constructors: ⊕∨
creates or-trees and ⊕∧ creates and-trees. And-attack
trees l⊕s∧ and or-attack trees l⊕s∨ consist of a list of sub-
attacks – again attack trees. The third constructor creates
a base attack as a pair of state sets written N(I,s). For
example, a two step and-attack leading from state set I
via si to s is expressed as
` [N(I,si),N(si,s)]⊕(I,s)∧
• Attack tree refinement, validity and adequacy:
Attack trees have their own refinement (not to be mixed
up with the model transformation presented in this paper).
An abstract attack tree may be refined by spelling out the
attack steps until a valid attack is reached: `A :: (σ::
state) attree). The validity is defined constructively
(code is generated from it) and its adequacy with respect
to a formal semantics in CTL is proved and can be used to
facilitate actual application verification as demonstrated
her in the stepwise system refinements.
In this paper, we present an extension of this formal
process introducing refinement of Kripke structures. It refines
a system model based on a formal definition of a combination
of trace refinement and structural refinement. The definition
allows to prove property preservation results crucial for an
iterative development process. The refinements of the system
specification can be interleaved with attack analysis while
security properties can be proved in Isabelle. In each iteration
security qualities are accumulated while continuously attack
trees scrutinize the design.
System Model Attack Tree
Refined 
System
Refinement
System Model Attack Tree
Refined 
System
Refinement
System Model Attack Tree
Refined 
System
Refinement
Fusion/UML Initial System Design
Fig. 2. Refinement-Risk-Cycle iterates design, risk analysis, and refinement
II. THE REFINEMENT-RISK-CYCLE FOR SECURE IOT
SYSTEM
We first introduce the iterative process of refinement and
attack tree analysis (the “Refinement-Risk-Cycle”) providing
an overview followed by the formal definition in Isabelle and
the resulting property preservation.
A. Overview of RR-Cycle
As an initial step, the Fusion/UML method serves to de-
velop a system architecture from early requirements. This
system architecture is translated into the Isabelle Infrastructure
framework: actors in UML become Isabelle Infrastructure
actors, UML system classes are represented by locations in
the infrastructure graph, and the class attributes and pre- and
postconditions of methods are formalised in the local and
global policies. The identification of attacks, using for example
invalidation [23], can then reveal paths of state transitions
through the system model where the global security policy
is violated. In an iteration, these attack paths provide details
useful for refining the system specification by adding security
controls, for example, access control, privacy preservation,
or blockchain. The addition of detail, however, may in turn
introduce new vulnerabilities that lead to new iterations of the
process. Security properties may be proved at each level of the
iteration. They are true for this abstraction level of the system
model and remain true in the refined system. However, new
attacks may be found despite proved security. The Refinement-
Risk Cycle process is graphically depicted in Figure 2.
B. Refinement
Intuitively, a refinement changes some aspect of the type
of the state, for example, replaces a data type by a richer
datatype or restricts the behaviour of the actors. The former
is expressed directly by a mapping of datatypes, the latter is
incorporated into the state transition relation of the Kripke
structure that corresponds to the transformed model. In other
words, we can encode a refinement within our framework as a
relation on Kripke structures that is parametrized additionally
by a function that maps the refined type to the abstract type.
The direction “from refined to abstract” of this type mapping
may seem curiously counter-intuitive. However, the actual
refinement is given by the refinement that uses this function
as an input. The refinement then refines an abstract to a
more concrete system specification. The additional layer for
the refinement can be formalised in Isabelle as a second1
refinement relation vE . The relation mod_trans is typed as a
relation over triples – a function from a threefold Cartesian
product to bool, the type containing true and false only.
The type variables σ and σ′ input to the type constructor
Kripke represent the abstract state type and the concrete
state type. Consequently, the middle element of the triples
selected by the relation mod_trans is a function of type
σ′ ⇒ σ mapping elements of the refined state to the abstract
state. The expression in quotation marks after the type is
again the infix syntax in Isabelle that allows the definition
of mathematical notation instead of writing mod_trans in
prefix manner. This nicer infix syntax is already used in the
actual definition. Finally, the arrow =⇒ is the implication of
Isabelle’s meta-logic while −→ is the one of the object logic
HOL. They are logically equivalent but of different types:
within a HOL formula P , for example, as below ∀x.P−→Q,
only the implication −→ can be used.
mod_trans :: (σ Kripke × (σ’ ⇒ σ) × σ’ Kripke)
⇒ bool ("_ v(_) _")
K vE K’ ≡ ∀ s’ ∈ states K’. ∀ s ∈ init K’.
s →∗σ′ s’ −→ E(s) ∈ init K∧ E(s) →∗σ E(s’)
The definition of K vE K’ states that for any state s of
the refined Kripke structure that can be reached by the state
transition in zero or more steps from an initial state s0 of the
refined Kripke structure, the mapping E from the refined to
the abstract model’s state must preserve this reachability, i.e.,
the image of s0 must also be an initial state and from there
the image of s under E must be reached with 0 or n steps.
C. Property Preserving System Refinement
A first direct consequence of this definition is the following
lemma where the operator / in E/(init K’) represents
function image, that is the set, {E(x).x ∈ init K’}.
lemma init_ref: K vE K’ =⇒ E/(init K’) ⊆ init K
A more prominent consequence of the definition of refinement
is that of property preservation. Here, we show that refinement
preserves the CTL property of EFs which means that a
reachability property true in the refined model K’ is already
true in the abstract model. A state set s′ represents a property
in the predicate transformer view of properties as sets of
states. The additional condition on initial states ensures that
we cannot “forget” them.
theorem prop_pres:
K vE K’ =⇒ init K ⊆ E/(init K’) =⇒
∀ s’ ∈ Pow(states K’). K’ ` EF s’
−→ K ` EF (E/(s’))
It is remarkable, that our definition of refinement by Kripke
structure refinement entails property preservation and makes
1The first refinement relation in this framework is on attack trees summa-
rized in Section C.
it possible to prove this as a theorem in Isabelle once for all,
i.e., as a meta-theorem. However, this is due to the fact that
our generic definition of state transition allows to explicitly
formalise such sophisticated concepts like reachability. For
practical purposes, however, the proof obligation of showing
that a specific refinement is in fact a refinement is rather
complex justly because of the explicit use of the transitive
closure of the state transition relation. In most cases, the
refinement will be simpler. Therefore, we offer additional help
by the following theorem that uses a stronger characterisation
of Kripke structure refinement and shows that our refinement
follows from this.
theorem strong_mt:
E/(init K’) ⊆ init K ∧ s →σ′ s’ −→ E(s) →σ E(s’)
=⇒ K vE K’
This simpler characterisation is in fact a stronger one: we
could have s→σ′s′ in the refined Kripke structure K’ and
¬(E(s)→σE(s′)) but neither s nor s′ are reachable from initial
states in K’. For cases, where we want to have the simpler one-
step proviso but still need reachability we provide a slightly
weaker version of strong_mt.
theorem strong_mt’:
E/(init K’) ⊆ init K ∧ (∃ s0 ∈ init K’. s0 →∗ s)
∧ s →σ′ s’ −→ E(s) →σ E(s’) =⇒ K vE K’
This idea of property preservation coincides with the clas-
sical idea of trace refinement as it is given in process algebras
like CSP. In this view, the properties of a system are given
by the set of its traces. Now, a refinement of the system is
given by another system that has a subset of the traces of
the former one. Although the principal idea is similar, we
greatly extend it since our notion additionally incorporates
refinement. Since we include a state map σ’⇒σ in our
refinement map, we additionally allow structural refinement:
the state map generalises the basic idea of trace refinement by
traces corresponding to each other but allows additionally an
exchange of data types. As we see in the application to the
case study, the refinement steps may sometimes just specialise
the traces: in this case the state map σ’⇒σ is just identity.
III. APPLYING RR-CYCLE TO IOT HEALTHCARE
EXAMPLE
We now first give a tabular overview of the steps taken for
the case study. Following the RR-Cycle, we have modelled
and analysed the IoT healthcare application in four iterations
summarised in the table in Figure 3.
How each of these models is refined in each iteration, as
well as the attack trees that exhibit vulnerabilities, is discussed
in the following sections as indicated in the last column of the
table in Figure 3.
A. Initial Step: Fusion/UML for System Architecture
The Fusion/UML process for object oriented design and
analysis has been used to derive a system design for the
application scenario. For reasons of conciseness, we omit here
the details presenting just one of the main outcomes of the
System Attack Where
Initial Fusion system
home-cloud-hospital
Eve can perform
action get at cloud
Sections
III–III-D
Refinement-Risk-Cycle Iteration 1
Access control by
DLM labels
Eve can perform
action eval at
cloud; changes
label to her own
Sections
IV-A,
IV-A4
Refinement-Risk-Cycle Iteration 2
Privacy preserving
functions type
label_fun
Eve puts Bob’s data
labelled as her own
Sections
IV-B,
IV-B3
Refinement-Risk-Cycle Iteration 3
Global blockchain Eve is an insider
impersonating
the blockchain
controller
Sections
IV-C–
IV-C4
Refinement-Risk-Cycle Iteration 4
Consensus (for
example Nakamoto)
blockchain
no attack known
yet
Section
IV-D
Fig. 3. Iterated application of Refinement-Risk(RR)-Cycle
analysis process: the system class model as depicted in Figure
4. Note that, within the security perimeter, only the cloud
server and the connected hospital (or other client institutions)
are situated. The smartphone and the home server feature
as data upload devices and the smartphone additionally as a
control device that is included in some of the use cases. This is
a consequence of the GDPR [15] requirements which are thus
immediately settled in the initial architecture. Another result of
the Fusion/UML analysis along with this system architecture
is a set of operation schemas based on the system class model,
additional use cases and object collaborations. For details see
[22].
B. Infrastructures, Policies, and Actors
The Isabelle Infrastructure framework supports the repre-
sentation of infrastructures as graphs with actors and policies
attached to nodes. These infrastructures are the states of the
Kripke structure.
The transition between states is triggered by non-
parametrized actions get, move, eval, and put executed
by actors. Actors are given by an abstract type actor and
a function Actor that creates elements of that type from
identities (of type string written ’’s’’ in Isabelle). Actors
are contained in an infrastructure graph constructed by Lgraph
– here the IoT healthcare case study example.
ex_graph ≡ Lgraph
{(home,cloud), (sphone,cloud), (cloud,hospital)}
(λ x. if x = home then {’’Patient’’} else
(if x = hospital then {’’Doctor’’} else {}))
ex_creds ex_locs
home ∗ 1
sphone
PIN
∗
1
system border security perimeter
Auth
patients
reg usrs
1 Has ∗
DB
table
1
1
Controls
hospital
staff
table
Fig. 4. System class model for IoT healthcare system
This graph contains a set of location pairs representing
the topology of the infrastructure as a graph of nodes and a
functionthat assigns a set of actor identities to each node (loca-
tion) in the graph. The last two graph components ex_creds
and ex_locs are here abbreviated only (for the definitions
see [16]). The function ex_creds associates actors to a pair
of string sets by a pair-valued function whose first range
component is a set describing the credentials in the possession
of an actor and the roles the actor can take on; ex_locs defines
the data residing at the component. Corresponding projection
functions for each of the components of an infrastructure graph
are provided; they are named gra for the actual set of pairs
of locations, agra for the actor map, cgra for the credentials,
and lgra for the data at that location.
Infrastructures contain an infrastructure graph and a policy
given by a function that assigns local policies over a graph to
all locations of the graph.
datatype infrastructure =
Infrastructure igraph
[igraph, location] ⇒ policy set
There are projection functions graphI and delta when
applied to an infrastructure return the graph and the policy,
respectively. For our healthcare example, the initial infrastruc-
ture contains the above graph ex_graph and the local policies
defined shortly.
hc_scenario ≡ Infrastructure
ex_graph local_policies
The function local_policies gives the policy for each
location x over an infrastructure graph G as a pair: the first
element of this pair is a function specifying the actors y that
are entitled to perform the actions specified in the set which
is the second element of that pair.
local_policies G x ≡
case x of
home ⇒ {(λ y. True, {put,get,move,eval})}
| sphone ⇒
{((λ y. has G (y,’’PIN’’)), {put,get,move,eval})}
| cloud ⇒ {(λ y. True, {put,get,move,eval})}
| hospital ⇒
{((λ y. (∃ n. (n @G hospital) ∧
Actor n = y ∧ has G (y, ’’skey’’))),
{put,get,move,eval})}
| _ ⇒ {})
Policies specify the expected behaviour of actors of an infras-
tructure. They are given by pairs of predicates (conditions) and
sets of (enabled) actions. They are defined by the enables
predicate: an actor h is enabled to perform an action a in
infrastructure I, at location l if there exists a pair (p,e) in
the local policy of l (delta I l projects to the local policy)
such that the action a is a member of the action set e and the
policy predicate p holds for actor h.
enables I l h a ≡ ∃ (p,e) ∈ delta I l. a ∈ e ∧ p h
The global policy is ‘only the patient and the doctor can
access the data in the cloud’:
global_policy I a ≡ a /∈ hc_actors
−→ ¬(enables I cloud (Actor a) get)
C. Infrastructure State Transition
The state transition relation uses the syntactic infix notation
I → I’ to denote that infrastructures I and I’ are in this
relation. To give an impression of this definition, we show
here just one of several rules that defines the state transition
for the action get because this rule will be adapted in the
process of refining the system specification. Initially, this rule
expresses that an actor that resides at a location l (h @G l)
and is enabled by the local policy in this location to “get”
can change the state of that location to the string value s
representing data stored in location l’.
get˙data: G = graphI I =⇒ h @G l =⇒
l ∈ nodes G =⇒ l’ ∈ nodes G =⇒
enables I l’ (Actor h) get =⇒ s ∈ lgra G l’ =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(Lgraph (gra G)(agra G)(cgra G)
(lgra G (l := lgra G l ∪ {s})))
(delta I)
=⇒ I →n I’
Based on this state transition and the above defined
hc_scenario, we define the first Kripke structure.
hc_Kripke ≡
Kripke { I. hc_scenario →∗ I } {hc_scenario}
D. Attack: Eve can get data
How do we find attacks? The key is to use invalidation [23]
of the security property we want to achieve, here the global
policy. Since we consider a predicate transformer semantics,
we use sets of states to represent properties. The invalidated
global policy is given by the following set shc.
shc ≡ {x. ¬ (global_policy x ’’Eve’’)}
The attack we are interested in is to see whether for the
scenario
hc_scenario ≡ Infrastructure ex_graph local_policies
from the initial state Ihc ≡{hc_scenario}, the critical
state sgdpr can be reached, that is, is there a valid attack
(Ihc,shc)?
For the Kripke structure
hc_Kripke ≡ Kripke { I. hc_scenario →∗ I } Ihc
we first derive a valid and-attack using the attack tree proof
calculus.
` [N(Ihc,HC),N(HC,shc)]⊕(Ihc,shc)∧
The set HC is an intermediate state where Eve accesses the
cloud.
The attack tree calculus [14] exhibits that an attack is
possible.
hc_Kripke ` EF shc
We can simply apply the Correctness theorem AT_EF to
immediately prove this CTL statement. This application of the
meta-theorem of Correctness of attack trees saves us proving
the CTL formula tediously by exploring the state space in
Isabelle proofs. Alternatively, we could use the generated code
for the function is_attack_tree in Scala (see Section C) to
check that a refined attack of the above is valid.
IV. ENTERING THE CYCLE
A. First Refinement Iteration: Adding DLM Access Control
The Decentralised Label Model (DLM) [32] allows labelling
data with owners and readers. We adopt it for our model.
Labelled data is given by the type dlm × data where data
can be any data type. We provide functions owns and readers
that enable specifying when an actor may access a data item.
has_access G l a d ≡ owns G l a d ∨ a ∈ readers d
In the first refinement of the model in the RR-Cycle, we thus
use labeled data to adapt the infrastructures.
1) Refinement Map: Isabelle allows overloading of constant
names, that is, the same name can be used for different
constants if these constants differ in their types or reside in dif-
ferent theories. We use the latter option and redefine the type
infrastructure in a new theory RRLoopTwo (the original
one was called RRLoopOne). Included in that redefinition of
the new type is the redefinition of all involved constructors and
projection functions. Note that Isabelle’s overloading permits
the use of the same names. To disambiguate these equally
named constructors, we can make use of the Isabelle name
spaces: RRLoopOne.infrastructure and
RRLoopTwo.infrastructure allow to reference the different
types of infrastructures and equally RRLoopOne.gra and
RRLoopTwo.gra, for example, refer to the two igraph pro-
jection functions. The extended names including the theory
name RRLoopOne or RRLoopTwo need only be used if the
disambiguation is necessary (as for example below when we
define the refinement map for this concrete first refinement
step). However, as long as Isabelle can disambiguate the name
from the context, we can use the single names, for example,
infrastructure or gra.
In the refined model RRLoopTwo, the new type
infrastructure keeps now dlm × data instead of just
data in the igraph.
Additionally as a preparation for defining the refinement,
we need to define now a function from the new infrastructure
type to the old one that projects out the data labels we
have just introduced. This is visible in the last input to
the Lgraph constructor where we map out the first data
component snd(RRLoopTwo.lgra (graphI I) l) of a dlm
× data pair for each location l. The function fmap is a
”map” function for finite sets that we defined ourselves (see
also Section IV-E).
definition refmap :: RRLoopTwo.infrastructure ⇒
RRLoopOne.infrastructure
where ref_map I =
RRLoopOne.Infrastructure
(RRLoopOne.Lgraph
(RRLoopTwo.gra (graphI I))
(RRLoopTwo.agra (graphI I))
(RRLoopTwo.cgra (graphI I))
(λ l. fmap snd (RRLoopTwo.lgra (graphI I) l)))
In the above expression, we deliberately put the theory names
RRLoopOne and RRLoopTwo for all constructors and types
to enhance the understanding. In fact, this is only necessary
for the type definition in the first line. For the constructors,
e.g. agra, in the actual definition these can be omitted since
Isabelle is capable of disambiguating them from the context.
2) Refined State Transition: Also the state transition is now
redefined for the refined theory RRLoopTwo while keeping the
same name and also overloading the infix syntax →n. This
first refinement iteration now implements access control in the
labeled data type but we also need to redefine the semantics
of the state transition. The refined rule get_data checks the
labels for the data item stored in a location l’ and only gives
access if – in addition to get being enabled for an actor h –
also this actor is among the readers or is the owner. In this
case, the data item including the label can be copied to the
location l where h resides.
get˙data: G = graphI I =⇒ h @G l =⇒
l ∈ nodes G =⇒ l’ ∈ nodes G =⇒
enables I l (Actor h) get =⇒
((Actor h’, hs), n) ∈ (lgra G l’) =⇒
Actor h ∈ hs ∨ h = h’ =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(Lgraph (gra G)(agra G)(cgra G)
lgra G (l := lgra G l
∪ {((Actor h’, hs), n)}))
(delta I)
=⇒ I →n I’
3) Proof of Refinement: We put those extension together
by redefining a new Kripke structure hc_KripkeT.
hc_KripkeT ≡
Kripke {I. hc_scenarioT →∗ I} {hc_scenarioT}
In the above, we also use the redefinition of the involved
infrastructure states, for example, hc_scenarioT, where the
T stands for Two. Note that these are definitions in a locale;
they need to have different names since locales have a flat
name space.
However, these preparation pay off since we can finally
apply our refinement theory from Section II-B to prove
hc_Kripke vrefmap hc_KripkeT.
Moreover, we can use in addition the meta-theory about re-
finement developed there: applying the theorem strong_mt’
allows to reduce this proof obligation to showing
ref_map / init hc_KripkeT ⊆ init hc_Kripke ∧
(∀ s s’. (∃ s0 ∈ init K’. s0 → s) ∧
s → s’ −→ rmapT s → rmapT s’).
4) Attack: Eve can change labels: We can already observe
another attack: Eve can also process data using the eval action
at the cloud: we can prove there is a path (EF) in the system
leading to the corresponding attack state.
hc_KripkeT `
EF {I. enables I cloud (Actor ’’Eve’’) eval}
Once we have proved this CTL statement, we can use the
Completeness theorems for the attack tree calculus (see Sec-
tion C) and can thus derive that an attack exists: Eve can
tamper with the access control labels by processing labeled
data. We need to prove privacy preservation, i.e. that labels
are preserved. As a countermeasure to this attack, the next
iteration of the refinement cycle thus enforces label preserving
functions.
B. Second Iteration: Privacy Preservation
The labels of data must not be changed by processing.
This invariant can be formalized in our Isabelle model by a
type definition of functions on labeled data that preserve their
labels.
typedef label_fun = {f :: dlm × data ⇒ dlm × data.
∀ x. fst x = fst (f x)}
We also define an additional function application operator m
on this new type. Then we can use this restricted function
type to implicitly specify that only functions preserving labels
may be applied in the definition of the system behaviour in
the state transition rules.
This additional type definition label_fun and its accom-
panying operators build the core of the refined theory
RRLoopThree where we also redefine the infrastructure type
and corresponding operators and projection functions.
1) State Transition Refinement: The crucial point for this
refinement to RRLoopThree is that the state transition changes
to incorporate the new restrictions on label processing. The
rule for eval now enforces the use of labelled functions.
a) The process rule: This rule prescribes how data within
the infrastructure may be processed. It imposes that only
privacy preserving functions may be applied to data (see
Section IV-C). This is achieved by using the application
operator m because it enforces the variable f to be of type
label_fun. The existing data item ((Actor a’, as), n)
is replaced by f m((Actor a’, as), n) while preserving
the label owing to the properties of type label_fun. Clearly,
the actor needs to be eval enabled in his location where also
the data must reside.
process: G = graphI I =⇒ h @G l =⇒
l ∈ nodes G =⇒ enables I l (Actor h) eval =⇒
((Actor h’, hs), n) ∈ lgra G l =⇒
Actor h ∈ hs ∨ h = h’ =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(Lgraph (gra G)(agra G)(cgra G)
((lgra G)(l := lgra G l - {(y, x). x = n}
∪ {(f::label_fun)m((Actor h’, hs), n)}))))
(delta I)
=⇒ I →n I’
b) Processing preserves privacy: Furthermore, we can
prove now that only entitled users (owners and readers) can
access data: privacy is preserved by the use of label preserving
functions. We can prove that processing preserves ownership
for all paths globally (expressed using the CTL quantifier AG).
That is, in all states of the Kripke structure and all locations
of the infrastructure graph we have that the ownership in the
initial state hc_scenario will persist.
theorem priv_pres: h ∈ hc_actors =⇒
l ∈ hc_locations =⇒
owns (Igraph hc_scenario) l (Actor h) d =⇒
hc_KripkeR ` AG x. ∀ l ∈ hc_locations.
owns (Igraph x) l (Actor h) d
2) Refinement Map: as in the previous step, we define
the refined Kripke structure hc_KripkeR now for the refined
theory RRLoopThree and the redefined infrastructure states,
here for example, hc_scenarioR as initial state of the state
transition.
hc_KripkeR ≡
Kripke { I. hc_scenarioR →∗ I } {hc_scenarioR}
Also a new datatype map ref_mapR mapping the infrastruc-
ture type of RRLoopThree to that of RRLoopTwo is defined.
Note that here we only need to re-embed the constituents
of the infrastructure of RRLoopThree with the corresponding
constructors of RRLoopTwo within the definition. In the pre-
vious refinement map we needed to map out the first element
of each dlm × data pair for each location. Now the actual
structure of the labeled data is very similar but the function
type changes to labeled functions. This happens automatically
by the re-embedding.
definition refmapR :: RRLoopThree.infrastructure ⇒
RRLoopTwo.infrastructure
where ref_mapR I = RRLoopTwo.Infrastructure
(RRLoopTwo.Lgraph
(RRLoopTwo.gra (graphI I))
(RRLoopTwo.agra (graphI I))
(RRLoopTwo.cgra (graphI I))
(RRLoopTwo.lgra (graphI I)))
Applying our refinement theory we now prove
hc_KripkeT vref_mapR hc_KripkeR.
It is important to note that by the additional meta-theorem
prop_pres the properties proved for hc_Kripke and
hc_KripkeT carry over to hc_KripkeR.
3) Attack: Eve can simply put data: When trying to prove
a theorem to express that different occurrences of the same
data in the system must have the same labels, we fail. The
reason for this is the following attack.
hc_KripkeR `
EF I. enables I cloud (Actor ’’Eve’’) put
Eve could learn the data by other means than using the privacy
preserving functions and using the action put to enter that data
as new data to the system labelled as her own data. As a
countermeasure, we need a concept to guarantee consistency
across the system: blockchain.
C. Third RR-Cycle Iteration: Blockchain Consistency
One major achievement of a blockchain is that it acts like
a distributed ledger, that is, a global accounting book. A
distributed ledger is a unique consistent transcript keeping
track of protected data across a distributed system. In our
application, the ledger must mainly keep track of where the
data resides for any labelled data item. We formalize a ledger
thus as a type of functions that maps a labelled data item to a
set of locations. In this type, we further constrain each data to
have at most one valid data label of type dlm. This is achieved
by stating that there exists a unique (∃!) label l for which the
location set ld(l, d) assigned to by the ledger is not empty
– unless it is empty for all labels for d.
typedef ledger = { ld :: dlm × data ⇒ location set.
∀ d. (∀ l. ld (l, d) = {}) ∨
(∃! l. ld (l, d) 6= {}) }
The addition of set makes the range of the ledger a set of sets
of locations which allows for none (empty set) or a number
of locations to be assigned to a data item.
1) Ledger enables Data Protecting State Transition: The
set of rules for defining the state transition of infrastructures
needs to be adapted to the refined model. The refinement by a
ledger is incarnated into the system specification to guarantee
consistency across distributed units. The state transition rules
have to be adapted yet again but also the type dlm needs to
be refined replacing actors by identities since otherwise the
uniqueness of the label imposed in the ledger typedef cannot
be proved for actors. The abstract models intentionally did
not stipulate Actor to be injective to allow for insider attacks
– now the ledger enforces the use of identities rather than actor
“roles”.
2) State Transition Refinement: We illustrate the changes
of this refinement step again on the rule for get first. Since
now the model is fairly complete, we finally also show the
other rules.
a) The get data rule: This rule now requires that the
ledger be updated by noting that the data item also resides in
the new location l. This is achieved by unifying the existing
set of locations L for this data item with the new location l.
The existing set of locations L is simply retrieved by applying
the ledger ledgra G to the data item n and its label (h’,
hs). The update of the ledger at the position ledgra G ((h’,
hs), n) of this data item uses the operator := to change the
ledger to contain the new list of locations L ∪ {l}.
get˙data: G = graphI I =⇒ h @G l =⇒
l ∈ nodes G =⇒ l’ ∈ nodes G =⇒
enables I l’ (Actor h) get =⇒
Actor h ∈ hs ∨ h = h’ =⇒
ledgra G (n, (Actor h’, hs)) = L =⇒ l’ ∈ L =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(Lgraph (gra G)(agra G)(cgra G)(lgra G)
(ledgra G ((h’, hs), n) := L ∪ {l})
(delta I)
=⇒ I →n I’
b) The put data rule: It assumes an actor h residing at a
location l in the infrastructure graph G and being enabled the
put action. If infrastructure state I fulfils those preconditions,
the next state I’ can be constructed from the current state by
adding the data item n with label (h, hs) at location l. The
addition is given by updating (using :=) the existing ledger
ledgra G. The ledger is set for this labelled data item (n,
(h, hs)) initially as the singleton set {l} containing just this
location. Note that the first component h marks the owner of
this data item as h. The other components are the reader list
hs, and the actual data n.
put: G = graphI I =⇒ h @G l =⇒
enables I l (Actor h) put =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(Lgraph (gra G)(agra G)(cgra G)(lgra G)
(ledgra G ((Actor h, hs), n) := l))
(delta I)
=⇒ I →n I’
c) The process rule: This rule is now simplified by use
of the ledger. The update changes the ledger’s domain by
re-assigning – again using update – the location set L to
the new input (f m((a’, as),n)) of the ledger function
ledgra G. First, the old value of the data item ((a’, as),
n) is deleted by assigning it to the empty set {} to preserve
the invariant of the ledger type. Note, that this semantics of
process changes the data on processing consistently in all parts
of the distributed system (see resulting consistency property
in Section IV-C4).
process: G = graphI I =⇒ a @G l =⇒
enables I l (Actor a) eval =⇒
a ∈ as ∨ a = a’ =⇒ ledgra G ((a’, as), n) = L =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(Lgraph (gra G)(agra G)(cgra G)(lgra G)
(ledgra G ((a’, as), n) := {})
(f m((a’, as),n)):= L)
(delta I)
=⇒ I →n I’
d) The delete rule: The owner of the data may delete his
or her data from all locations in the infrastructure graph. Note
that, different to the previous rules, here are no preconditions
on the location of the actor nor the location of the data other
than that they are in the infrastructure graph. Neither is there
any requested enabledness of actions imposed on the actor.
That is, the owner can delete his data anywhere. Also note,
how the use of the ledger simplifies the deletion of data
throughout the system: it suffices to update the ledger to the
empty set; automatically the data is deleted everywhere.
del˙data: G = graphI I =⇒ a ∈ actors G =⇒
l ∈ nodes G =⇒ l ∈ L =⇒
ledgra G ((a’, as), n) = L =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(Lgraph (gra G)(agra G)(cgra G)(lgra G)
(ledgra G ((a’, as), n) := {}))
=⇒ I →n I’
e) The move rule: This rule completes the set of induc-
tive rule defining the semantics of the state transition relation
→n. This inductive rule states that if an actor h resides in a
location l of the infrastructure graph G and a target’s location
l’ local policy entitles this actor to the move action, then the
infrastructure I can transit into the infrastructure I’ where I’
is defined by an auxiliary function move_graph (omitted here,
for details see [16])
move: G = graphI I =⇒
h ∈ actors_graph(graphI I) =⇒
h’ ∈ actors_graph(graphI I) =⇒ l ∈ nodes G =⇒
l’ ∈ nodes G =⇒ enables I l’ (Actor h) move =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(move_graph_a a l l’ (graphI I))
(delta I)
=⇒ I → I’
3) Refinement Map: In the extended infrastructure of the
refined system the infrastructure graph needs to be extended
by the ledger. The resulting infrastructure in the refined
theory RRLoopFour thus contains a ledger. So, the refinement
map needs to transform the ledger in the infrastructure graph
into a map from locations to sets of labeled data.
definition refmapF :: RRLoopFour.infrastructure ⇒
RRLoopThree.infrastructure
where
ref_mapF I = RRLoopThree.Infrastructure
(RRLoopThree.Lgraph
(RRLoopThree.gra (graphI I))
(RRLoopThree.agra (graphI I))
(RRLoopThree.cgra (graphI I))
(ledger_to_loc (ledgra (graphI I)))
The projection ledgra just maps out the ledger but the
auxiliary function ledger_to_loc performs the main data
type transformation defined by the following functions.
dlm_to_dlm ≡ (λ ((s :: string), (sl :: string set)).
(Actor s, fmap Actor sl))
data_trans ≡
(λ (l :: (string × string set),d :: string).
(dlm_to_dlm l, d))
ledger_to_loc ld l ≡
if l ∈ U range(Rep_ledger ld)
then fmap data_trans {dl. l ∈ (ld dl)} else {}
The function Rep_ledger is the injection from elements of
the ledger type into the set defining the type. It is automatically
created by Isabelle from the type definition.
To make the refinement proofs feasible, it is necessary to
provide a set of rather technical lemmas to support the use of
this transformation within the refinement map. For details see
[16]. A central lemma is clearly the uniqueness of the data
given by the labels.
lemma ledger_to_loc_data_unique:
Rep_ledger ld (dl,d) 6= {} =⇒
Rep_ledger ld (dl’,d) 6= {} =⇒ dl = dl’
Central as well is a transformation lemma.
lemma ledgra_ledger_to_loc:
finite{dl::(char list×char list set)×char list.
l ∈ Rep_ledger (ledgra G) dl} =⇒
l ∈ (ledgra G ((a, as), n)) =⇒
((Actor a, fmap Actor as), n) ∈
ledger_to_loc(ledgra G) l
As before we show hc_KripkeR vref_mapF hc_KripkeF for
the corresponding models. The main change between those
infrastructure models is due to the use of the ledger. It is visible
in the infrastructure graph where an additional component ,
here ex_ledger appears.
ex_graph ≡ Lgraph
{(home, cloud), (sphone, cloud), (cloud,hospital)}
(λ x. if x = home then {’’Patient’’} else
(if x = hospital then {’’Doctor’’} else {}))
ex_creds ex_locs ex_ledger
This parameter ex_ledger specifies in our running example
that the data ”42”, for example, some bio marker’s value, is
owned by the patient and can be read by the doctor and is
currently only contained in location cloud.
ex_ledger ≡ (λ (l, d).
if d = ’’42’’ ∧ l = (’’Patient’’,{’’Doctor’’})
then {cloud} else {})
4) Ledger Guarantees Consistent Data Ownership: We
can now prove that data protection is consistent across the
infrastructure. If in any two locations the same data item n
resides, then the labeling must be the same. That is, the owner
and set of readers are identical.
theorem Ledger_con: h ∈ hc_actors =⇒
h’ ∈ hc_actors =⇒
l ∈ hc_locations =⇒ l’ ∈ hc_locations =⇒
l ∈ ledgra G ((h, hs), n) =⇒
l’ ∈ ledgra G ((h’, hs’), n) =⇒
(h, hs) = (h’, hs’)
This property immediately follows from the invariant property
of the type definition of the type ledger (see Section IV-C)
and privacy preservation given by the label function type (see
Section IV-A). This means that the corresponding interactive
proofs that we have to provide to Isabelle are straightforward
and largely supported by its automated tactics (see the Isabelle
source code for details).
D. Attack and Fourth RR-Cycle: Eve can overwrite blockchain
Despite the above proved theorem, there is yet another
aspect – as usual outside the model – that leads to an attack.
In the abstract specification of a ledger, we have omitted the
implementation of a blockchain. We could have a centrally
controlled blockchain in which one part signs the entire
blockchain to guarantee consistency. Eve could be an insider
impersonating the blockchain controller. In that case, she could
just overwrite the entry made by Bob and add his data as her
own. Formally, we can re-use the put attack of the previous
level using the rule put above to overwrite Bob’s entry by
Eve’s.
As a refinement for the RR-Cycle, we need to consider
a consensus algorithm, like Nakamoto’s used in Bitcoin,
between the participants in the distributed system to chose
a different leader for each blockchain commitment to avoid
the attack. Adding a refinement with a Nakamoto consensus
to our model is possible but rather complex. However, we
can simply specify the effect of this refinement in the system
specification by adding
∀ a as. ledgra G ((Actor a, as), n) = {}
as a precondition to the rule put, that is, the data item must
not yet be assigned to anyone in the ledger in order to allow
a put action.
E. Evaluation and Detecting Design Errors
To give a a rough estimate of the formalisation and proof
effort of the application of the Refinement-Risk cycle to the
IoT healthcare application provided in this paper: each of the
8 files (four pairs of files: one for the semantics and the other
for the example infrastructure) has between 200 and 800 lines
of Isabelle code: definitions and mostly proof script lines.
Clearly, an important motivation for going through this
rather tedious process of formally refining a system speci-
fication in this framework is the property preservation that
we have established as a meta-theorem on the refinement in
Section II-B. It allows us to preserve once gained security
and privacy properties and increasingly make the specification
more secure.
The effort to do the refinement proofs is rather high: the
proofs of refinement in each level are up to 400 lines of
Isabelle code and sometimes necessitated proving additional
lemmas about the new operators, for example, for label
preserving functions and the ledger type.
As mentioned in the introduction and repeatedly throughout
the paper, one main advantage of the formal security refine-
ment approach presented in this paper is that it filters out errors
that are easily made in the stepwise design. We have found
and corrected a number of small errors, like inconsistencies
of the premises in the rules for the state transition at the
four different levels of model abstraction. For example, the
patient data was positioned in the cloud in RRLoopThree and
at home in RRLoopFour. The formal refinement with vrefmap
forces out these errors immediately. The simple ones, like the
former example, are easy to fix but others require more work
to understand them, find a solution and provide the necessary
lemmas to then prove the refinement. The more subtle ones
are sometimes harder to fix like the following example shows.
When we introduce the DLM labels in the first iteration,
the corresponding refinement map is based on the function
refmap mapping the refined data type to the abstract data
type. In this first map, we need to eliminate the data label.
So, we simply apply the function snd to all data items of type
dlm ×data to map to type data; formally applying fmap
snd (see Section IV-A1).
In the earlier version of the IoT case study [17], the rule
for delete uses set difference - to delete the labeled data item
in RRLoopTwo.
del˙data: G = graphI I =⇒ h ∈ actors_graph G =⇒
l ∈ nodes G =⇒ ((Actor h, hs), n) ∈ lgra G l =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(Lgraph (gra G)(agra G)(cgra G)(lgra G)
((lgra G)(l := (lgra G l) -
{((Actor h, hs), n)}))
(delta I)
=⇒ I →n I’
The subtle design error manifests itself when we try to prove
that the semantics using the above rule is a refinement of the
abstract model hcKripkeOne. This semantics still allows the
data item n to occur with two different labels say, (Actor h,
hs) 6= (Actor h’, hs’) (pre-ledger model). We may have
two similar traces where deletion appears once on ((Actor
h, hs), n) and once on ((Actor h’, hs’), n). The re-
finement map maps both traces to one trace in the abstract
model hcKripkeOne. In the abstract trace, after the deletion,
the state does not contain the data item n any more, while in
both refined traces one copy of the data item (with mutually
different labels) prevails. Both are insecure states that must
not implement the abstract specification: a users data that is
believed to be eradicated is still in the data base potentially
with another label of an attacker. So, for privacy enforcement
it is absolutely crucial to avoid such design errors.
This design error can be eradicated by making sure that a
deletion operation actually deletes all copies of the data item.
del˙data’: G = graphI I =⇒ h ∈ actors_graph G =⇒
l ∈ nodes G =⇒ ((Actor h, hs), n) ∈ lgra G l =⇒
I’ = Infrastructure
(Lgraph (gra G)(agra G)(cgra G)(lgra G)
((lgra G)(l := (lgra G l) -
{(y, x). x = n }))
(delta I)
=⇒ I →n I’
The same problem occurs in the process rule but the same
solution applies (Section IV-B1 shows the fixed rule). Once
this solution has been found, we need to prove that this fixed
semantics preserves traces now. A core lemma we need to
prove to this end is the following.
lemma fmap_lem_del_set: finite S =⇒
∀ n ∈ S.
fmap f (S - {y. f y = f n}) = (fmap f S) - {f n}
V. CONCLUSION AND RELATED WORK
In this paper, we have presented a formal integrated frame-
work for a Refinement-Risk-Cycle that interleaves formal
system specification with attack tree analysis by a refinement
based on refinement. Thereby, formally proved engineering
of the security of a system becomes possible. The method is
particularly useful for IoT systems since it allows modeling
physical as well as logical realities. We have illustrated this
process on an IoT healthcare example running four iterations
adding access control, privacy preservation, and a ledger
for global consistency. Framework and casestudy are fully
formalised and proved in Isabelle.
Formal system specification refinement has been investi-
gated for some time initially for system refinement in the
specification language Z [11] but a dedicated security refine-
ment has not been formalised for some time [31]. The idea
to refine a system specification for security has been already
addressed in B [5], [35]. The former combines the refinement
of B with system security policies given in Organisation based
Access Control (OrBAC) and presents a generic example of
a system development. While B is supported by its own tool
Atelier B, it does not provide a formalisation in a theorem
prover unlike our integration which supports dedicated security
concepts like attack trees and enables useful meta-theory over
the integration. The paper [35] looks at attacks within the B
framework but it aims at designing a monitor that catches
actions forbidden by the policy not on using these attacks
to refine the system specification. Dynamic risk assessment
using attack formalism, like attack graphs, has recently found
great attention, e.g. [9]. However, usually, the focus of the
process lies on attack generation and response planning while
we address the design of secure systems. Rather than incident
response, we intend to use early analysis of system specifica-
tion to provide a development of secure systems. This includes
physical infrastructure, like IoT system architecture, as well as
organisational policies with actors.
While the additional consideration of structural refinement
in our process of security refinement greatly generalises the
classical concepts of trace refinement, the latter has been
designed for safety properties. These are properties that hold
along execution paths of a system. This is known to be insuf-
ficient in general for security properties: a security property
often has to do with implicit information flows that may
lead to an attacker learning some confidential information by
observing various runs of a system over time thereby noticing
differences in the outcomes. McLean has already shown in his
seminal paper [30] that for these kind of implicit information
flow properties, it is necessary to consider a security property
as a set of set of traces rather than a set of traces, leading
on to notions like noninterference that have been formalised
in Isabelle, e.g., [33]. However, we argue that our way of
modeling systems and their execution using a layered model of
CTL and Kripke structures underneath the actual infrastructure
model including actors allows a more fine-grained view. As we
see in the example application, the explicit modeling of actors
allows reasoning about specific attackers as actors. Thereby,
rather than trying to establish security properties at the very
basis of state based system modeling, we propose to consider
the analysis of information flows and their observability by
certain actors at the level of modeling the actual infrastructure.
When actors are actually part of the model, it is more natural to
add notions of implicit information flow and then postulating
the reachability of security critical states – in which an actor
has learned some confidential information – as a state. A trace
based safety analysis of whether those states are reachable
then results in the same analysis as a classical noninterference
analysis – our layered model just clarifies the boundaries at a
finer scale.
The use of a distributed ledger, also known as a blockchain,
is new for formal system specification and verification. There
are currently many attempts to formalize blockchains but
most of them are very close to technical implementations,
e.g. [27], thus obliterating the possibility to provide clear
specification of legal requirements as is possible in the Isabelle
Infrastructure framework and has been illustrated on GDPR
requirements [15]. Moreover, to our knowledge, none of these
formal models has been produced in Isabelle or similar Higher
Order Logic tools until very recently [29], where Marmsoler
addresses the definition of an Isabelle framework for the
verification of dynamic system architectures for blockchain.
Our formalization uses a generic notion of a ledger that may
simply control consistency in the distributed application. This
is the way forward because it enables the minimal expression
of the crucial properties of a ledger. This minimal expression
may not only be used as a basis for conformance proofs of
more refined technical models of a ledger, like a blockchain,
but also provides the crucial invariant properties for a ledger.
We have used label preserving functions in our infrastructure
model. They guarantee part of the data protection consistency
when processing data. An interesting next step is to model
smart contracts. We believe this to be a particularly rewarding
extension because our model permits the expression of locality
and policy based behaviour rules which naturally lends itself
to allow modeling dependant action sequences using logical
preconditions.
Research on risk assessment and attack trees has recently
increased using formal approaches including verification, e.g.,
[1], [2], [4] but not in Higher Order Logic. With respect to
system development the focus is often on the generation of
the attack tree not the system, e.g. [36]. In [3], the authors
build a foundation for system based attack trees but do not
mechanise it in a theorem prover. Model transformation for
attack trees has been addressed in [28] as a practical tool to
translate between different frameworks but not to reason about
refinement. Data refinement has been addressed in Isabelle
[10] but not with respect to security engineering.
The relationship between Higher Order logic and Mod-
elchecking has been first explored by Kobayashi (see [26] for
a paper subsuming previous results). Modelchecking has been
realized as well in Isabelle [8] but we use the different formali-
sation of CTL [13]. Developing secure systems using Isabelle
has been done using the formalisation of noninterference to
develop an online conference system [25].
The novelty of our approach is to integrate formally refine-
ment with the risk assessment by attack trees into a construc-
tive security refinement process. Abstract system specifications
can be provably refined and finally code can be extracted to
major programming languages, e.g. Scala.
This material is based upon work supported by the ERA-
NET CHIST-ERAhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100000001 under
Grant No. 102112. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European
Union.
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APPENDIX
This section provides an overview of the current exten-
sion of the Isabelle Infrastructure framework in relation to
previous works and how it integrates the Refinement-Risk
cycle (Section A). It also summarizes the formalization of the
existing theories for Kripke structures and the temporal logic
CTL (Section B), as well as the attack tree formalisation and
Correctness and Completeness theorems (Section C). Finally,
Section D presents the IoT Healthcare system – the case study
on which the Refinement-Risk cycle is validated in this paper.
A. Isabelle Infrastructure Framework
Isabelle is a generic Higher Order Logic (HOL) proof
assistant. Its generic aspect allows the embedding of so-
called object-logics as new theories on top of HOL. There
are sophisticated proof tactics available to support reasoning:
simplification, first-order resolution, and special macros to
support arithmetic amongst others. Object-logics are added
to Isabelle using constant and type definitions forming a so-
called conservative extension. That is, no inconsistency can
be introduced: new types are defined as subsets of existing
types; properties are proved using a one-to-one relationship
to the new type from properties of the existing type. The use
of HOL has the advantage that it enables expressing even the
most complex application scenarios, conditions, and logical
requirements. Isabelle enables the analysis of meta-theory, that
is, we can prove theorems in an object logic but also about it.
This allows the building of telescope-like structures in
which a meta-theory at a lower level embeds a more concrete
“application” at a higher level. Properties are proved at each
level. Interactive proof is used to prove these properties but
the meta-theory can be applied to immediately produce results.
Figure 1 in Section I-A gives an overview of the Isabelle
Infrastructure framework with its layers of object-logics – each
level below embeds the one above.
The Isabelle Infrastructure framework has been created ini-
tially for the modeling and analysis of Insider threats [24]. Its
use has been validated on the most well-known insider threat
patterns identified by the CERT-Guide to Insider threats [6].
More recently, this Isabelle framework has been successfully
applied to realistic case studies of insider attacks in airplane
safety [19] and on auction protocols [20]. These larger case
studies as well as complementary work on the analysis of
Insider attacks on IoT infrastructures, e.g. [21], have motivated
the extension of the original framework by Kripke structures
and temporal logic [13] as well as a formalisation of attack
trees [14]. Recently, GDPR compliance verification has been
demonstrated [15].
B. Kripke Structures and CTL
Kripke structures and CTL model state based systems and
enable analysis of properties under dynamic state changes.
A state transition relates snapshots of systems which are
the states. The temporal logic CTL then enables expressing
security and privacy properties.
In Isabelle, the system states and their transition relation are
defined as a class called state containing an abstract constant
state_transition. It introduces the syntactic infix notation
I → I’ to denote that system state I and I’ are in this
relation over an arbitrary (polymorphic) type σ. The operator
:: is a type judgement to coerce the type variable σ into the
class type. The arrow⇒ is the operator for functions on types
and bool is the HOL inbuilt type of truth values true and
false.
class state =
fixes state_transition :: (σ :: type) ⇒ σ ⇒ bool
("_ → _")
The above class definition lifts Kripke structures and CTL
to a general level. The definition of the inductive relation is
given by a set of specific rules which are, however, part of
an application like infrastructures (Section III-B). Branching
time temporal logic CTL is defined in general over Kripke
structures with arbitrary state transitions and can later be
applied to suitable theories, like infrastructures.
Based on the generic state transition → of the type class
state, the CTL-operators EX and AX express that property
f holds in some or all next states, respectively. The CTL
formula AG f means that on all paths branching from a state
s the formula f is always true (G stands for ‘globally’). It
can be defined using the Tarski fixpoint theory by applying
the greatest fixpoint operator. In a similar way, the other CTL
operators are defined. The formal Isabelle definition of what
it means that formula f holds in a Kripke structure M can be
stated as: the initial states of the Kripke structure init M need
to be contained in the set of all states states M that imply
f .
M ` f ≡ init M ⊆ { s ∈ states M. s ∈ f }
In an application, the set of states of the Kripke structure is
defined as the set of states reachable by the infrastructure state
transition from some initial state, say ex_scenario.
ex_states ≡ { I. ex_scenario →∗ I }
The relation→∗ is the reflexive transitive closure – an operator
supplied by the Isabelle theory library – applied to the relation
→.
The Kripke constructor combines the constituents initial
state and state set.
ex_Kripke ≡ Kripke ex_states {ex_scenario}
In Isabelle, the concept of sets and predicates coincide (more
precisely they are isomorphic) 2. Thus a property is a
predicate over states which is equal to a set of states. For
example, we can then try to prove that there is a path (E) to
a state in which the property eventually holds (in the Future)
by starting the following proof in Isabelle.
ex_Kripke ` EF property
Since property is a set of states, and the temporal operators
are predicate transformers, that is, transform sets of states to
2In general, this is often referred to as predicate transformer semantics.
sets of states, the resulting EF property is also a set of states
– and hence again a property.
C. Attack Trees in Isabelle
Attack trees [34] are a graphical language for the analysis
and quantification of attacks. If the root represents an attack,
its children represent the sub-attacks. Leaf nodes are the basic
attacks; other nodes of attack trees represent sub-attacks. Sub-
attacks can be alternatives for reaching the goal (disjunctive
node) or they must all be completed to reach the goal (con-
junctive node). Figure 5 is an example of an attack tree taken
from a textbook [34] illustrating the attack of opening a safe.
Nodes can be adorned with attributes, for example costs of
Fig. 5. Attack tree example illustrating disjunctive nodes for alternative
attacks refining the attack “open safe”. Near the leaves there is also a
conjunctive node “eavesdrop”.
attacks or probabilities which allows quantification of attacks
(not used in the example).
The following datatype definition attree defines attack
trees. Isabelle allows recursive datatype definitions similar to
the programming languages Haskell or ML. A datatype is
given by a “|” separated sequence of possible cases each of
which consists of a constructor name, the types of inputs to this
constructor, and optionally a pretty printing syntax definition.
The simplest case of an attack tree is a base attack. The
principal idea is that base attacks are defined by a pair of state
sets representing the initial states and the attack property – a
set of states characterized by the fact that this property holds
for them. Attacks can also be combined as the conjunction or
disjunction of other attacks. The operator ⊕∨ creates or-trees
and ⊕∧ creates and-trees. And-attack trees l⊕s∧ and or-attack
trees l⊕s∨ consist of a list of sub-attacks – again attack trees.
datatype (σ :: state)attree =
BaseAttack (σ set)×(σ set) ("N (_)")
| AndAttack (σ attree)list (σ set)×(σ set) ("_ ⊕(_)∧ ")
| OrAttack (σ attree)list (σ set)×(σ set) ("_ ⊕(_)∨ ")
The attack goal is given by the pair of state sets on the right
of the operator N, ⊕∨ or ⊕∧, respectively. A corresponding
projection operator is defined as the function attack.
When we develop an attack tree, we proceed from an
abstract attack, given by an attack goal, by breaking it down
into a series of sub-attacks. This proceeding corresponds to a
process of refinement. The attack tree calculus [14] provides
a notion of attack tree refinement elegantly expressed as
the infix operator v. Note that this refinement is different
from the notion of system refinement that will be presented
later in this paper. The intuition of developing an attack
tree by refinement from the root to the leaves is illustrated
in Figure 6 (the formal definition is in [14]). The example
attack tree on the left side has a leaf that is expanded by
the refinement into an and-attack with two steps. Refinement
of attack trees defines the stepwise process of expanding
abstract attacks into more elaborate attacks only syntactically.
There is no guarantee that the refined attack is possible if the
abstract one is, nor vice-versa. The attack tree calculus [14]
formalizes the semantics of attack trees on Kripke structures
and CTL enabling rigorous judgement whether such syntactic
refinements represent possible attacks.
A valid attack, intuitively, is one which is fully refined into
fine-grained attacks that are feasible in a model. The general
model provided is a Kripke structure, i.e., a set of states and a
generic state transition. Thus, feasible steps in the model are
single steps of the state transition. They are called valid base
attacks. The composition of sequences of valid base attacks
into and-attacks yields again valid attacks if the base attacks
line up with respect to the states in the state transition. If there
are different valid attacks for the same attack goal starting
from the same initial state set, these can be summarized in an
or-attack. The formal definition [14] is given in the table in
Figure 7. The semantics of attack trees is described by this
one recursive function. Since the definition can be given as
a recursive function, Isabelle code generation is applicable:
an executable decision procedure for attack tree validity can
be automatically generated in various programming languages,
for example, Scala.
Adequacy of the semantics is proved in [14] by proving cor-
rectness and completeness. The following correctness theorem
shows that if A is a valid attack on property s starting from
initial states described by I, then from all states in I there
is a path to the set of states fulfilling s in the corresponding
Kripke structure.
theorem AT_EF: ` A :: (σ :: state) attree) =⇒
(I, s) = attack A =⇒
Kripke {t . ∃ i ∈ I. i →^* t} I ` EF s
The inverse direction of theorem AT_EF is a completeness
theorem: if states described by predicate s can be reached from
a finite nonempty set of initial states I in a Kripke structure,
then there exists a valid attack tree for the attack (I,s).
theorem Completeness: I 6= {} =⇒ finite I =⇒
Kripke {t . ∃ i ∈ I. i →^* t} I ` EF s =⇒
∃ A :: (σ::state)attree. ` A ∧ (I, s) = attack A
Correctness and Completeness are proved in Isabelle [14],
[16]. They are not just necessary proofs on the attack tree
semantics but the theorems allow easy transformation of
properties between the embedded notions of attack tree validity
` and CTL formulas like EF. The relationship between these
A’’A’
(s1,s2) A’’’
B C
A’’A’
A’’’
A
A
Fig. 6. Attack tree example illustrating refinement of an and-subtree.
fun is_attack_tree :: [(σ :: state) attree] ⇒ bool ("`_")
where
att_base: ` Ns = ∀ x ∈ fst s. ∃ y ∈ snd s. x → y
| att_and: ` (As :: (σ::state attree list)) ⊕s∧ =
case As of
[] ⇒ (fst s ⊆ snd s)
| [a] ⇒ ` a ∧ attack a = s
| a # l ⇒ ` a ∧ fst(attack a) = fst s
∧ ` l ⊕(snd(attack a),snd(s))∧
| att_or: ` (As :: (σ::state attree list)) ⊕s∨ =
case As of
[] ⇒ (fst s ⊆ snd s)
| [a] ⇒ ` a ∧ fst(attack a) ⊇ fst s ∧ snd(attack a) ⊆ snd s
| a # l ⇒ ` a ∧ fst(attack a) ⊆ fst s ∧ snd(attack a) ⊆ snd s
∧ ` l ⊕(fst s - fst(attack a),snd s)∨
Fig. 7. Definition of attack tree validity as one recursive predicate.
notions can be applied to case studies. That is, if we apply
attack tree refinement to spell out an abstract attack tree for
attack s into a valid attack sequence, we can apply theorem
AT_EF and can immediately infer that EF s holds. Vice versa,
the theorem Completeness can be applied to directly infer the
existence of an attack tree from the former.
D. Edge Computing: IoT Healthcare System
The example of an IoT healthcare systems is from the
CHIST-ERA project SUCCESS [7] on monitoring Alzheimer’s
patients. Figure 8 illustrates the system architecture where data
collected by sensors in the home or via a smartphone helps
monitoring bio markers of the patient. The data collection
is in a cloud based server to enable hospitals (or scientific
institutions) to access the data which is controlled via the
smartphone. It is a typical edge network application: the
smartphone and the sensor hub in the home are typical edge
devices that are capable of doing processing data without
uploading to the cloud server.
cloud
hospital
home 
Patient
sensor hub
sphone
Doctor
Fig. 8. IoT healthcare monitoring system for SUCCESS project [7]
